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THE NEED FOR A SHARED
RESPONSIBILITY REGIME BETWEEN
STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS TO
PREVENT HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS CAUSED BY CYBER-
SURVEILLANCE SPYWARE
INTRODUCTION
he advancement of technology and Internet connectivity
has contributed significantly in the field of human rights.
1
Smartphones have enabled users to voice their unfiltered opin-
ions about politicians, organize mass protests against social pol-
icies, and document and distribute images of police brutality
through multiple platforms at a press of a button.
2
In fact, the
mass protests marking the height of the Arab Spring
3
in 2011
were organized by activists empowered by Twitter, YouTube,
Facebook and other social media outlets, while their respective
authoritarian governments underestimated the potential of the
Internet.
4
Unfortunately, the technology that “catalyzed the
Arab Spring is only as good or as bad as those who use it.”
5
The
same authoritarian governments also turned to these social me-
dia outlets to spread misinformation and create alternative nar-
ratives.
6
Moreover, the very same regimes, and others alike,
have devoted their wealth and authority to purchase surveil-
lance spyware systems from multinational corporations to
closely monitor Internet activity in order to track and extinguish
1. Emma Daly, Why Tech is a Double-Edged Sword for Human Rights,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 6, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/06/why-
tech-double-edged-sword-human-rights.
2. Id.
3. The Arab Spring was a wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings
that took place in the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and
2011, challenging some of the region’s authoritarian regimes. Arab Spring,
Pro-Democracy Protests, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/event/Arab-Spring (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
4. Jessi Hempel, Social Media Made the Arab Spring, But Couldn’t Save
It, WIRED (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/social-media-made-
the-arab-spring-but-couldnt-save-it/.
5. Id.
6. Id.
T
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dissidents.
7
Examples of surveillance spyware used by regimes
with abusive human rights records include: Amesys (purchased
7. Trevor Timm, Spy Tech Companies & Their Authoritarian Customers,
Part II: Trovicor and Area SpA, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/spy-
tech-companies-their-authoritarian-customers-part-ii-trovicor-and-area-spa
(last visited Oct. 20, 2017). See also Trevor Timm, Spy Tech Companies & Their
Authoritarian Customers, Part I: FinFisher and Amesys,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/spy-tech-companies-their-authoritar-
ian-customers-part-i-finfisher-and-amesys (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). See also
Nicole Perlroth, Governments Turn to Commercial Spyware to Intimidate Dis-
sidents, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/30/tech-
nology/governments-turn-to-commercial-spyware-to-intimidate-dissi-
dents.html?_r=0.
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by Libya),
8
Gamma International (Bahrain),
9
NSO Group (Mex-
ico, the United Arab Emirates and possibly Saudi Arabia),
10
Qos-
mos (Syria),
11
and Trovicor GmbH (Syria).
12
The use of spyware
8. FIDH, THE AMESYS CASE (2014), available at
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/report_amesys_case_eng.pdf. The Eagle-System
produced by Amesys, a French corporation, was found to be present in Libya
after the fall of the Gadhafi regime. Id.
9. UK’s OECD Guidelines Contact Point Finds Gamma, Breached Human
Rights by Selling FinFisher Spyware to Bahrain, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/uks-oecd-guidelines-contact-point-
finds-gamma-breached-human-rights-selling-finfisher-spyware (last visited
Sept. 30, 2017). Spyware produced by Gamma International, a British corpo-
ration, found in infected devices of three Bahraini activists. The British NCP
found the actions of Gamma inconsistent with Chapter II and Chapter IV of
the OECD Guidelines. See U.K. NATIONAL CONTACT POINT FOR THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL &
GAMMA INTERNATIONAL U.K. LTD: FINAL STATEMENT AFTER EXAMINATION OF
COMPLAINT (2014), available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/402462/BIS-15-93-
Final_statement_after_examination_of_complaint_Privacy_Interna-
tional_and_Gamma_International_UK_Ltd.pdf.
10. Azam Ahmed & Nicole Perlroth, Using Texts as Lures, Government Spy-
ware Targets Mexican Journalists and Their Families, N.Y. TIMES (June 19,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/americas/mexico-spyware-
anticrime.html?mcubz=1. Pegasus, spyware produced by NSO Group, an Is-
raeli corporation, was found in Mexico. Id. The devices of several human rights
lawyers and journalists were sent a series of texts infected with Pegasus, a
software capable of infiltrating mobile devices to monitor every detail of a per-
son’s cellular life, including calls, texts, e-mails, contacts, and calendars. Id.
The software is even capable of “us[ing] the microphone and camera on a phone
for surveillance, turning a target’s smartphone into a personal bug.” Id. NSO
made its first deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2013, and “within
a year, the Emirati government installed NSO spyware on the phone of Ahmed
Mansoor, a prominent human rights activist.” Mark Mazzetti et al., A New Age
of Warfare: How Internet Mercenaries Do Battle for Authoritarian Govern-
ments, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/03/21/us/politics/government-hackers-nso-darkmatter.html.
Since then Mansoor lost his job, lost his passport, lost $140,000 USD in his
bank account, was beaten, and sentenced to ten years in prison for “damaging
national unity.” Id. Most recently, Omar Abdaluaziz, a Montreal-based Saudi
dissident and friend of deceased journalist Jamal Khashoggi, filed a lawsuit in
Israel, “charging that NSO improperly helped the . . . UAE spy on individuals
with no criminal records and who posed no threat of violence” via their
smartphones. David D. Kirkpatrick, Israeli Software Helped Saudis Spy on
Khashoggi, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/12/02/world/middleeast/saudi-khashoggi-spyware-israel.html.
See also Oren Liebermann, How a Hacked Phone May Have Led Killers to
798 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
has not only resulted in the invasion of privacy of its citizens,
but it has also led to a plethora of other human rights violations
ranging from arbitrary detention and torture to death.
13
This Note proposes a better regulatory method in the sale of
surveillance spyware. This method entails a multi-stakeholder
approach that builds upon the newly established International
Code of Conduct (ICoC) for Private Security Service Providers
14
and its oversight committee, the ICoC Association (ICoCA).
15
The proposed multi-stakeholder approach will include an over-
sight committee, similar to the ICoCA, consisting of representa-
tives from multinational enterprises (MNEs) or corporations
that produce and sell cyber surveillance spyware, representa-
tives from civil society groups, such as Human Rights First or
Amnesty International, and representatives from states. Similar
to the ICoCA, this multi-stakeholder approach may encourage
more transparency by requiring MNEs to complete reporting,
monitoring and certification requirements. This proposedmodel,
however, will require states to take a more active role and to
Khashoggi, CNN (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/12/mid-
dleeast/khashoggi-phone-malware-intl/index.html. Researchers at Citizen Lab
confirmed Abdaluaziz’s phone was infected by NSO’s Pegasus after he clicked
on a link in a fake text message concerning a package Abdaluaziz was expect-
ing, and all of his conversations with Khashoggi were ultimately tracked. Id.
11. France Investigate Tech Firm Accused of Aiding Syria, REUTERS (July
26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/syria-france-qosmos/france-investi-
gates-tech-firm-accused-of-aiding-syria-idUSL6E8IQN9520120726. Spyware
made by Qosmos, a French corporation, was found in Syria.
12. Rishi R. Gupta, Germany’s Support of Assad: Corporate Complicity in
the Creation of the Syrian Surveillance State Under the European Convention
on Human Rights, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1357, 1359²60 (2013). Spyware pro-
duced by Trovicor, a German corporation, was found in Syria. Syrian President
“Bashar al-Assad used intrusive surveillance tools [produced by Trovicor] to
track individuals’ movements, access electronic files, and even detain and tor-
ture members of the opposition to Assad’s government.” Id.
13. Id. at 1360. See also Sarah Lange, Article: The End of Social Media Rev-
olutions, 38 FLETCHER F.WORLDAFF., 47, 49²50 (2014).
14. SWISS CONFEDERATION, THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS (Nov. 9, 2010), available at
https://icoca.ch/sites/all/themes/icoca/assets/icoc_english3.pdf (last visited Jan.
13, 2017).
15. The ICoCA Overview, INT’L CODE CONDUCT ASS’N (Feb. 2017),
https://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA-Overview_0.pdf (last
visited Jan. 13, 2017).
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become accountable stakeholders, forming a shared responsibil-
ity regime
16
between a state and non-state actors. This regime
will not only oblige state actors to monitor corporate actions to
prevent human rights violations, but it will also provide a better
possibility of recourse to victims of human rights violations.
Part I of this Note will provide the following background infor-
mation for contextual purposes: (1) the rise of MNEs as an effect
from globalization
17
and the trend toward privatization, and (2)
the emerging trend of globalized mass surveillance since the
“War on Terror” and increase in cyber torts.
18
Part II of this Note
will then focus on the difficulty of finding corporate liability in
the current international legal system because of the general in-
applicability of human rights laws to non-state actors,
19
like
MNEs, and the non-binding obligations of soft law, such as the
United Nations Guiding Principles of Business and Human
Rights, which have resulted in ineffective remedial measures for
human rights violations.
20
Next, Part III of this Note will examine under what circum-
stances will wrongful acts of multi-national enterprises be rec-
ognized as internationally wrongful acts that fall under the re-
sponsibility of the state under international law. Part IV of this
Note will then evaluate the newly formed ICoCA, a multi-stake-
holder initiative, guided by the principles of the ICoC for Private
Security Service Providers. It will evaluate the structure and
function of this oversight committee and how it strives to pre-
vent private military service providers from committing human
rights violations.
16. Jean d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Ac-
tors and States in International Law: Introduction, 62 NETH. INT. L. REV., 49,
49²67 (2015).
17. Yu Makogon & Yu Kinchevskyaya, Development of Transnational Cor-
porations in the Aspect of Globalization, 18 VÌSNIK. KIÏVSʹKOGONACÌONALʹNOGO
UNÌVERSITETU ÌMENÌ TARASA äEVÿENKA. EKONOMÌKA 21, 21²24 (2014).
18. Markos Karavias, Shared Responsibility and Multinational Enterprises,
62 NETH. INT. L. REV 91, 93 (2015). See also Valsamis Mitsilegas, Surveillance
and Digital Privacy in the Transatlantic “War on Terror:” The Case for a Global
Privacy Regime, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016).
19. MARKOSKARAVIAS, CORPORATEOBLIGATIONSUNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
19 (2013).
20. Stephen R. Layne, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Viola-
tions: Redressability Avenues in the United States and Abroad, 18 GONZ. J.
INT’L L. 1, 13²14, (2015).
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Finally, Part V of this Note will evaluate the proposition of
making the state an accountable stakeholder by forming a
shared responsibility regime
21
between the state and MNEs.
This shared responsibility regime will build upon the newly es-
tablished multi-stakeholder regime of the ICoCA. Similar to the
ICoCA, the proposed oversight committee will also consist of rep-
resentatives from MNEs, civil society groups and states.
Through collaboration, the shared responsibility regimewill pro-
vide better monitoring, reporting and certification practices for
corporate entities to follow. Most importantly, the proposed re-
gime will require a more active involvement of states, which will
not only oblige state actors to monitor corporate actions to pre-
vent human rights violations, but will also provide a better pos-
sibility of recourse to victims of human rights violations.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This Part will provide contextual information about the emer-
gence of corporations or multinational enterprises in a global-
ized economy. Many factors, including the advancement of tech-
nology, have allowed states and their citizens to transcend terri-
torial boundaries and become more interconnected.
22
This Part
will also explore approximately when and how this phenomenon
occurred, as well as its consequences, including the incidental
increase in the practice of mass surveillance, where states across
the world use technological means to not only defend its national
security, but to also surveil their own citizens.
23
Mass surveil-
lance walks a fine line between protecting citizens and intruding
upon their privacy.
24
The data collected in mass surveillance re-
spects no international boundaries, and “cross-border data col-
lection touches on a bucket of related rights that privacy protec-
tions safeguard.”
25
This includes the rights to free expression,
21. d’Aspremont et al., supra note 16, at 49²67.
22. ILO, A FAIRGLOBALIZATION: CREATINGOPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL x (2004).
See also Jing de Jong-Chen, Data Sovereignty, Cybersecurity and Challenges
for Globalization, 16 GEO. J. INT’LAFF. 112, 113²14 (2015).
23. Mitsilegas, supra note 18, at 3²4.
24. Id.
25. Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The
Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 475²
82 (2016).
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freedom of conscience and religion, free assembly, free associa-
tion and other such rights.
26
While it may come as a surprise
that corporations from states like France, Germany and Italy
have sold intrusive technology to regimes like the Syrian gov-
ernment, such transactions are not uncommon.
27
E-mails were
published by WikiLeaks in 2015 of Hacking Team, revealing
that the Italian corporation sold its intrusive software to coun-
tries including: Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Bahrain, Uz-
bekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and
many other governments with authoritarian or one party sys-
tems.
28
A. The Rise of MNEs
MNEs have become a superpower in today’s world.
29
Since the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the international economy
has been altered drastically “by the advance of globalization,
sweeping technological changes and the emergence of new and
powerful competitors, such as China and India.”
30
Globalization
is often “understood to mean major increases in worldwide trade
and exchanges in an increasingly open, integrated and border-
less international economy.”
31
It is “a process of interaction and
integration among the people, companies and governments of
different nations.”
32
The process has not only “contributed to a
¶denationalization’ of economic and social activities,” but also an
“increase in cross-border capital and international trade,”
thereby “creating a permissive and protective legal and regula-
tory environment for MNEs.”
33
Additionally, MNEs have been
further empowered due to the trend towards privatization,
where corporate entities are entrusted by states with the run-
26. Id.
27. Gupta, supra note 12, at 1360.
28. Cora Currier & Morgan Marquis-Boire, A Detailed Look at Hacking
Team’s Emails About its Repressive Clients, INTERCEPT (July 7, 2015),
https://theintercept.com/2015/07/07/leaked-documents-confirm-hacking-team-
sells-spyware-repressive-countries/.
29. Jed Greer & Kavaljit Singh, A Brief History of Transnational Corpora-
tions, https://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/47068-a-brief-history-of-transna-
tional-corporations.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
30. Makogon & Kinchevskyaya, supra note 17, at 21²24.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Karavias, supra note 18, at 93.
802 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
ning of hospitals and prisons, the supply of energy and the pro-
vision of security services.
34
This trend has “given rise to a re-
treat of the state from various fields where it traditionally” ex-
clusively regulated, allowing MNEs to enter “reserved state
businesses in the public service fields.”
35
Furthermore, the re-
treat of the state raises concerns over whether “such public del-
egations to private entities occur at the expense of democratic
processes . . . and individual justice.”
36
B. Emerging Trend of Mass-Surveillance and Uptick of Human
Rights Violations
The right of privacy is explicitly or implicitly present in domes-
tic legal systems around the world,
37
but it can also be found in
numerous international human rights instruments, including
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,
38
Interna-
tional Convention on Civil and Political Rights,
39
European
Charter on Human Rights
40
and European Union Charter of
34. Id.
35. KARAVIAS, supra note 19, at 2.
36. Id.
37. What Do Constitutional Privacy Protections Look Like Around the
World?, PRIVACY INT’L, https://privacyinternational.org/blog/1198/what-do-con-
stitutional-privacy-protections-look-around-world (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
38. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Article 12 of the UDHR states: “No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family home or corre-
spondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Id. art.
12.
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 17(1) of the ICCPR states: “(1) No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and rep-
utation. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.” Id. art. 17(1).
40. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 [herein-
after ECHR]. Article 8 of the ECHR Right to respect for private and family life:
(1) Everyone has the right of respect for his private and fam-
ily life, his home and his correspondence, (2) there shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except when in accordance with the law and when it is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the coun-
try, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
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Fundamental Rights.
41
Technological advancements may have
significantly improved economies around the globe, but they
have also made it significantly more difficult for the right of pri-
vacy to be respected and upheld.
42
Additionally, the War on Ter-
ror and the growing trend toward the privatization of policing
and security has led to the intensification of surveillance, where
“surveillance is [globalized and] both quantitatively (in terms of
volume of personal data accessed by the state) and qualitatively
(in terms of how and why such data is processed and analyzed)
different from traditional policing models that focus on the de-
tection of criminality.”
43
The United States National Security
Agency’s surveillance program, Prism, which was uncovered to
the world by ex-Central Intelligence Agency analyst Edward
Snowden in 2013, consisted of warrantless and limitless surveil-
lance of U.S. citizens and Internet users all around the world.
44
Beyond using such technological capabilities for policing, it “can
also provide authoritarian states with advanced surveillance ca-
pabilities and help governments crush democratic movements
before they can get off the ground.”
45
In a world where “data no longer respects international bound-
aries,” mass surveillance not only “touches on the right of pri-
vacy, but it also touches on related rights that privacy protec-
tions safeguard, such as the rights to free expression, free as-
sembly, free association,” and many other liberties.
46
It is espe-
cially disconcerting that collected data may be used to “stifle
such rights” by using it “to identify targets for arbitrary arrests
. . . or, even worse, to torture or kill.”
47
Thus, unsurprisingly,
of health, or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Id. art. 8.
41. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326). Article 8(1), which addresses the protection of personal
data, states, “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data con-
cerning him or her.” Id. art. 8(1).
42. de Jong-Chen, supra note 22, at 114.
43. Mitsilegas, supra note 18, at 2.
44. Edward Snowden: Leaks That Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC (Jan.
17, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964. See also Anja
Mihr, Good Cyber Governance: The Human Rights and Multi-Stakeholder Ap-
proach, 15 GEO. J. INT’LAFF. 24, 28 (2014).
45. Gupta, supra note 12, at 135²60.
46. Daskal, supra note 25, at 475²82.
47. Id.
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stories of detention and torture, aided by cutting-edge Western
surveillance technology, are not uncommon for transitioning
states that have endured bloody conflicts.
48
For example, after
the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya in August 2011,
the Wall Street Journal gained access to an abandoned security
unit in Tripoli, where journalists found posters and English-lan-
guage training manuals stamped with the name of the French
corporation, Amesys, along with “dossiers of Libyans’ online ac-
tivities lined up in floor to ceiling filing shelves.”
49
The dossiers
consisted of intercepted messages printed straight from Amesys’
“Eagle System,” all featuring the designation “https://eagle/in-
terceptions” at the upper right corner of each page.
50
Since then,
five individuals have filed a claim against Amesys in France’s
newly created Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Unit
of the Paris High Court.
51
Each of these individuals has testified
that he or she was arbitrarily arrested, detained in prison, tor-
tured, and interrogated about e-mail exchanges, chat messages
or social media postings obtained by the Libyan police force be-
tween January and February 2011.
52
According to engineers at
the Libyan Internet Provider, Amesys’ Eagle System became
fully operational after “two high-bandwidth ¶mirrors’ were in-
stalled³one on the country’s main fiber-optic trunk and one in-
side the DSL switchboard³to copy all Internet traffic and feed
48. Id.
49. Paul Sonne & Margaret Coker, Firms Aided Libyan Spies First Look
Inside Security Unit Shows How Citizens Were Tracked, WALL STREET J. (Aug.
30, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424053111904199404576538721260166388. See also Margaret
Coker & Paul Sonne, Life Under the Gaze of Gadhafi’s Spies, WALL STREET J.
(Dec. 14, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052970203764804577056230832805896 [hereinafter Coker &
Sonne, Life Under the Gaze of Gadhafi’s Spies].
50. Coker & Sonne, Life Under the Gaze of Gadhafi’s Spies, supra note 49.
51. FIDH, supra note 8.
52. Id. Paris’ High Court has yet to adjudicate this case. Id. So far, the Court
has opened an investigation into Amesys, and “placed Amesys under the status
of témoin assisté (assisted witness) for complicity in acts of torture committed
in Libya,” an identifier unique to French law that “lies somewhere between
being a simple witness and being indicted for a crime.” Erin Gifford, Nexa In-
vestigated for Sale of Surveillance Equipment Linked to Egypt Abuses,
CORPWATCH, https://corpwatch.org/article/nexa-investigated-sale-surveil-
lance-equipment-linked-egypt-abuses (last visited Dec. 2, 2018).
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it into the Eagle System.”
53
The system had the capability of in-
tercepting online and offline exchanges, allowing users to ob-
serve network traffic and peek into people’s e-mails, while stor-
ing all the communications from the monitored link.
54
Thus, the
system was able to detect and store the correspondence so that
users can easily search in real time keywords, email addresses
or names to identify suspects.
55
II. CORPORATE LIABILITYUNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
LAW
This Part will examine the difficulty of finding MNEs liable
under current international law. First, international law and,
more specifically, international human rights law only imposes
legal obligations to states and state actors.
56
Second, soft law,
such as the United Nations Guiding Principles of Business and
Human Rights, is simply a recommendation or guidance of due
diligence and best practices and, therefore, lacks any obligation
or binding force.
57
Third, the combination of the inapplicability
of hard law and reliance on soft law has resulted in the insuffi-
ciency of remedial measures for human rights violations.
58
A. International Human Rights Law Primarily Governs States
or State Actors—Not Private Individuals or Private Corpora-
tions
Under the “dominant view in international law theory” inter-
national law addresses states and their governments, identify-
ing them as primary actors.
59
Thus, international law only im-
poses duties on states (or state officials), and only they can incur
53. Matthieu Aikins, Jamming Tripoli: Inside Moammar Gadhafi’s Secret
Surveillance Network, WIRED (May 28, 2012),
https://www.wired.com/2012/05/ff_libya/.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. KARAVIAS, supra note 19, at 19. See also Carlos M. Vazquez, Direct v.
Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J.
TRASNAT’L L. 927, 932²33, (2005).
57. Adam McBeth & Justine Nolan, The International Protection and Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in INTERNATIONALCORPORATE LEGAL
RESPONSIBILITY 247 (Stephen Tully ed., 2012).
58. SIMON BAUGHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATE WRONGS CLOSING THE
GOVERNANCEGAP 251²56 (Janet Dine ed., 2015).
59. KARAVIAS, supra note 19, at 10. The dominant approach in international
relations theory is realism, which identifies states as the primary actors in the
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liability for the breach of such obligations.
60
Following the end of
World War II, “international law shifted beyond regulation . . .
of states to incorporate a body of rules concerned with the sub-
stantive interests of individuals” with a primary concern for the
relationship “between a state [government] and its nationals.”
61
Therefore, international human rights law traditionally in-
tended “to safeguard the rights and freedoms of individuals
against arbitrary state actions”³not against the actions of other
private individuals or entities, including corporations.
62
Instead, “international law today addresses the conduct of pri-
vate corporations indirectly, by requiring states to enact and en-
force regulations applicable to corporations,” and “only a small
number of international legal norms, [usually jus cogens], apply
directly to non-state actors.”
63
Thus, very few human rights
norms are directly applied to non-state actors, including MNEs,
under the “classic model” of international law.
64
For example,
the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft
Articles”) is only applicable to a private corporate entity if its
“conduct . . . is attributed to the state [through] a requisite link
between the corporation and the state.”
65
Moreover, “public in-
ternational law has not fully adapted to the new reality” of post-
globalization, so “international obligations remain incumbent on
states rather than on non-state actors, such as corporations,” de-
spite the fact that “[non-state actors’] adverse effects on human
rights have dramatically increased.”
66
Thus, there is “no inter-
national mechanism [that] exists under which corporations can
international system, whereas the minority theory, liberalism, identifies indi-
vidual and groups as primary actors with states representing them as agents
within the international system. See Anna-Marie Slaughter, Liberal Interna-
tional Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L
& POL’Y, 717, 721²28 (1995).
60. Vazquez, supra note 56, at 932²33. “The primary rules of international
law are addressed to states . . . , and under the secondary rules of international
law only states incur responsibility for breaching the primary rules of interna-
tional law.” Id.
61. KARAVIAS, supra note 19, at 19.
62. Id. at 19²21.
63. Vazquez, supra note 56, at 927.
64. Id.
65. Karavias, supra note 18, at 96.
66. Cedric Ryngaert, Transnational Private Regulation and Human Rights:
The Limitations of Stateless Law and the Re-Entry of the State, in HUMAN
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be held directly liable for breaches of customary or conventional
international law, including human rights law, [and] the only
available recourse is through domestic jurisdictions.”
67
B. The Introduction of Soft Law—United Nations Guiding Prin-
ciples of Business and Human Rights, Encouraging Businesses
to Respect Human Rights through Due Diligence
The United Nations and other non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) have largely avoided creating international legal
obligations on corporations, opting instead for a voluntary ap-
proach where businesses are encouraged to respect and protect
human rights.
68
In 1999, the United Nations Global Compact in-
itiative was officially launched, calling upon diverse groups of
businesses to voluntarily join as members to support and respect
the protection of international human rights and ensure their
company practices are not complicit in human rights abuses.
69
While as many as 4,858 companies were members of the Com-
pact by 2011, critics have noted that many corporations joined
the Compact purely for publicity purposes and to “pacify stake-
holders.”
70
In 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights promulgated the
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
(Norms), which “explicitly asserted the obligation of MNEs to
promote, secure and ensure the respect and protection of human
rights.”
71
The Norms, however, were also non-binding on MNEs;
instead, the “primary responsibility” of ensuring MNEs and
other business enterprises to “respect human rights” was desig-
nated to the states.
72
Moreover, the United Nations Commission
RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: DIRECT CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FORHUMAN RIGHTS
99, 99 (Jernej Letnar Cernic & Tara Van Ho eds., 2015).
67. Humberto Fernando Cantu Rivera, Business & Human Rights: From a
“Responsibility to Respect” to Legal Obligations and Enforcement, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: DIRECT CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FORHUMAN RIGHTS
303, 322 (Jernej Letnar Cernic & Tara Van Ho eds., 2015).
68. Layne, supra note 20, at 7²8.
69. Id. See also BAUGHEN, supra note 58, at 212²13.
70. Layne, supra note 20, at 8.
71. Id. at 7²8.
72. Id. See also Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
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on Human Rights did not approve the Norms and found that
they had no legal standing in April 2004.
73
Finally, in 2011, the
Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights “was unani-
mously endorsed by United Nation’s Human Rights Council . . .
as the first global standard for preventing and addressing the
risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to business ac-
tivity.”
74
The Guiding Principles framework is centered around
three pillars:
(1) state duties to protect against third party human rights vi-
olations through appropriate policies and regulation; (2) corpo-
rate responsibility to respect human rights through the exer-
cise of due diligence, including human rights impact assess-
ments, tracking and monitoring and other measures; and (3)
access by victims of human rights abuses to effective remedies,
both judicial and non-judicial.
75
The Guiding Principles, however, do not set forth any new le-
gal obligations that have not already been formerly established.
Principle 1 indicates that “states must protect against human
rights abuses within their territory by third parties, including
business enterprises, through effective legislation, regulation
and adjudication.”
76
States have a duty to protect a standard of
conduct, they must promote the rule of law in ensuring human
rights protection, and are responsible for human rights abuse by
private actors if the breach can be attributed to them or where
they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, pun-
ish and redress private actors’ abuse.
77
According to Principle 4,
“states should take additional steps to protect against human
rights abuses by business enterprises owned or controlled by the
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.refworld.org/docid/403f46ec4.html.
73. Comm. on Human Rights, Rep. on the Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/2004/23 E/CN.4/2004/127, at 333 (2004), available at http://www.ref-
world.org/pdfid/4267b3644.pdf.
74. Cantu Rivera, supra note 67, at 307²09.
75. Layne, supra note 20, at 8 (citing John Ruggie (Special Representative
of the Secretary General), Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007)).
76. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights [OHCHR], Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04, at princ.
1 (2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
77. Id.
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state, or that receive substantial support and services from state
agencies.”
78
Principle 5 specifies that “states do not relinquish
its obligations when they privatize the delivery of services to
businesses that may impact upon human rights.”
79
All of these
legal obligations have been formerly established by the Draft Ar-
ticles, which will be closely analyzed in Part III of this note.
On the other hand, Principle 11 stipulates that “business en-
terprises should respect human rights, avoid infringing on hu-
man rights of others and address adverse human rights im-
pacts,”
80
including “taking adequate measures for their preven-
tion, mitigation and where appropriate, remediation.”
81
Some
due diligence operational mechanisms proposed by the Guiding
Principles include adopting a publicly available statement of
commitment towards human rights,
82
adapting a risk manage-
ment system to mitigate actual impacts,
83
and tracking of the
78. Id. princ. 4.
79. Id. princ. 5.
80. Id. princ. 11.
81. Id.
82. Id. princ. 16. Principle 16 Policy Commitment states
As the basis for embedding their responsibility to respect hu-
man rights, business enterprises should express their com-
mitment to meet this responsibility through a statement of
policy that: (a) is approved at the most senior level of the busi-
ness enterprise, (b) is informed by relevant internal and/or
external expertise, (c) stipulates the enterprise’s human
rights expectations of personnel, business partners and other
parties directly linked to its operations, products or services,
(d) is publicly available and communicated internally and ex-
ternally to all personnel, business partners and other rele-
vant parties, (e) is reflected in operational policies and proce-
dures necessary to embed it throughout the business enter-
prise.
Id.
83. Id. princ. 17. Principle 17, Human Rights and Due Diligence, states “In
order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their ad-
verse human rights impacts, business enterprise should carry out human
rights due diligence. The process should include assessing actual and potential
human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking re-
sponses, and communicating how impacts are addressed. . . .” Id.
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implementation of the Guiding Principles’ human rights poli-
cies.
84
Thus, while the Guiding Principles have admirably
brought attention to the commitment businesses should have to-
wards protecting human rights, the framework remains a solely
voluntaristic system, without power to compel businesses to be
legally obligated to do so.
85
Some scholars have reasoned the Guiding Principles have trig-
gered a new “transnational private regulation” (TPR), where
MNEs essentially monitor themselves, but the effectiveness of a
TPR can vary.
86
For example, due to the divergence of interests
between MNEs and civil society, when “social goals are extrane-
ous to profit-driven business venture[s],” MNEs may not have
an incentive to follow a TPR “unless there is a clear business
case for it.”
87
While a business case might be created by con-
sumer pressure, “such substantial consumer pressure will more
likely materialize with firms with a larger market share, firms
focusing on higher consumer market segments and firms focus-
ing more on manufacturing and design than on sale of prod-
ucts.”
88
Finally, support for TPR is more likely to occur in coun-
tries with institutions that promote corporate social responsibil-
ity³”typically, liberal-democratic western countries”³and “if
such conditions are not present, a TPRwill not thrive.”
89
In other
words, “support for a TPR is a function of consumer and institu-
tional pressure,” but without such a foundation, “MNEs will [un-
likely] make strong human rights commitments through a TPR
and limit themselves to blanket statements [with no] genuine
desire to change business policies.”
90
84. Id. princ. 20. Principle 20 defines what tracking consist of: “In order to
verify adverse human rights impacts are being addressed, business enterprises
should track the effectiveness of their response. Tracking should: (a) be based
on appropriate qualitative and quantitative indicators, and (b) draw on feed-
back from internal and external sources, including affected stakeholders.” Id.
85. Layne, supra note 20, at 8.
86. Ryngaert, supra note 66, at 99²101.
87. Id. at 107.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 108.
90. Id.
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C. Insufficiency of Current Judicial and Non-Judicial Remedies
for Human Rights Violations in Finding Corporate Liability
The “state-centric focus of international human rights law has
created a number of problems for lawyers trying to hold busi-
nesses accountable for human rights abuses,” as businesses are
neither subjects of treaty obligations,
91
nor are they primary ac-
tors under international law.
92
Victims of businesses seeking re-
dress in their home country’s judicial system face extensive ob-
stacles.
93
For example, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) was previ-
ously described as “the main engine for transnational human
rights litigations in the U.S.,” but the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
94
re-
duced its utility by ruling that the presumption against extra-
territoriality, which normally applies to U.S. domestic legisla-
tion, must be applied to the ATS.
95
Thus, the ATS could no longer
be brought in holding MNEs accountable for human rights
abuses.
96
Even when a cause of action is available within the na-
tional legal system, a host of other issues can make seeking rem-
edies in the national legal system less attractive; for example,
the principle that corporations maintain a separate legal person-
ality may make it difficult to hold parent companies responsible
for actions of their subsidiaries because each is a separate legal
entity.
97
Additionally, legal systems like the United States,
where the doctrine forum non conveniens is applicable, may pre-
vent a case from moving forward when another jurisdiction is
more suitable or appropriate, such as the location where the al-
leged tort took place.
98
Given the possible locations of cyber torts
91. Stuart Wallace, Private Security Companies and Human Rights: Are
Non-Judicial Remedies Effective, 35 B.U. INT’L L.J. 69, 71 (2017).
92. David Bilchitz, Corporations and the Limits of State-Based Models for
Protecting Fundamental Rights in International Law, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 143, 146 (2016).
93. Wallace, supra note 91, at 72.
94. Id. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Kiobel (plaintiff) brought
suit against Royal Dutch Petroleum³a Dutch corporation³among other Brit-
ish and Nigerian corporations under the ATS, alleging the corporations aided
and abetted Nigerian military in violating the human rights of Nigerian na-
tionals. Karavias, supra note 18, at 106. See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115²19 (2013).
95. Wallace, supra note 91, at 72.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 73.
98. Id. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is:
812 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
like the ones alleged by the Libyan plaintiffs in the case against
Amesys, there may be an accountability gap if forum non con-
veniens is applied and a more appropriate country for the case
is determined to be a country with a weak judicial system but
not weak enough that would cause injustice to the plaintiff.
While London solicitors like Leigh Day have taken on a num-
ber of cases involving human rights abuses by MNEs occurring
in developing countries, there are similar hurdles to surmount
in bringing such claims before the courts of the UK.
99
Specifi-
cally, there is the need to: (1) establish jurisdiction, which means
the defendant corporation must be domiciled in the United King-
dom; (2) find a way around the separate corporate personality of
the English parent company and its foreign subsidiary; (3) es-
tablish the applicable law governing the tort claim; and (4) fund
the litigation.
100
Thus, while the British courts may be a possible
forum if the defendant corporation is incorporated or domiciled
in the United Kingdom, this still leaves a significant amount of
MNEs that will not be subjected to the same accountability and
potential plaintiffs without access to judicial remedy.
The Guiding Principles demand that non-judicial grievance
mechanisms be (1) legitimate by “enabling trust from the stake-
holder groups for whom they are intended”; (2) accessible and
“known to all stockholder groups for whom they are intended”;
(3) predictable with “a clear and known procedure” and “means
of monitoring implementation”; (4) equitable; and (5) transpar-
ent.
101
Non-judicial grievance mechanisms that mirror the Guid-
ing Principles, such as the Organization for Economic Coopera-
A discretionary power that allows courts to dismiss a case
where another court, or forum, is much better suited to hear
the case. A court will not grant a forum non conveniens dis-
missal if there is no other forum that could hear the case, or
if the other forum would not award the plaintiff any money
even if he or she won. Similarly, courts will not grant a forum
non conveniens dismissal where the alternative forum’s judi-
cial system is grossly inadequate.
Forum non Conveniens, LEGAL INFO. INST., www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fo-
rum_non_conveniens (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
99. BAUGHEN, supra note 58, at 172.
100. Id.
101. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, princ. 31.
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tion and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises, require countries who voluntarily join the OECD to
establish National Contact Points (NCPs) where victimsmay file
complaints about the operation of MNEs.
102
Similar to the Guid-
ing Principles, the OECD Guidelines are voluntary and not le-
gally enforceable, and the practice of NCPs varies within each
country; thus, a country may either take a passive stance on the
complaint or adopt a more proactive role.
103
For example, Privacy International, the European Center for
Constitutional and Human Rights, and two other Bahraini
NGOs filed an OECD complaint at the British NCP and German
NCP alleging Gamma International and Trovicor GmbH pro-
duced and sold surveillance technology and provided technolog-
ical support to Bahrain, and therefore, shared responsibility for
the arrests, imprisonment and torture of opposition members,
journalists and dissidents in Bahrain.
104
The German NCP re-
jected the complaint, finding it not substantial enough to war-
rant further scrutiny, whereas, the British NCP proceeded with
an investigatory review.
105
The British NCP, however, was only
able to find Gamma International lacked a due diligence process
and a publicly available statement of commitment to human
rights because the NCP lacked the investigatory powers, such as
the ability to compel documents or disclosure, to confirm the spe-
cific accusation alleged on the complaint.
106
Thus, even non-ju-
dicial remedies, such as the grievance mechanism available
through the OECD Guidelines, may not be sufficient avenues for
remedies under Principle 31 of the Guiding Principles.
107
III. ANALYSIS OF CIRCUMSTANCESWHEREMNES’ ACTIONS
WILL BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE STATE AS INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL ACTS FOR LEGALOBLIGATIONS TO ARISE: WHEN IS
102. About the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD,
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/about.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). See also
BAUGHEN, supra note 58, at 217²18.
103. Id.
104. UK Rebukes German-British Software Company Gamma, EUR. CENTER
CONST. & HUM. RTS., https://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/business-and-human-
rights/surveillance-technology.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See BAUGHEN, supra note 58, at 251²56.
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THERE AN ATTRIBUTABLENEXUS BETWEEN THE STATE AND
PRIVATE CORPORATION?
This Part will address when and how MNEs’ actions will be
attributable to a state for legal obligations to arise under inter-
national law. Section A will take a close examination of relevant
articles under the ILC’s Draft Articles to better understand
when state liability will arise for human rights violations. Sec-
tion B will examine the circumstances where corporate action
may be attributable to a state under the Draft Articles, including
when the actions of state-owned enterprises (SOE) may be at-
tributable to a state to incur liability under international law.
A. A Close Evaluation of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
The ILC spent over half a century to develop the Draft Articles
with the intention of developing the “law of state responsibility”
via observations of state practice and case law as opposed to
drafting a full convention or treaty.
108
The Draft Articles sought
to codify “the basic rules of international law concerning the re-
sponsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts” by laying
out the “conditions under international law for when [a state is]
to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions
and the legal consequences which flow [from] there.”
109
The general rule is that the only conduct attributed to a state
at the international level is that of its organs of government, or
others who have acted under the “direction, instigation or con-
trol of those organs.”
110
According to Article 4 of the Draft Arti-
cles:
(1) the conduct of any state organ is considered an act of that
state under international law, whether the organ exercises leg-
islative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever po-
sition it holds in the organization of the state, and whatever its
character as an organ of the central Government or of a terri-
torial unit of the state, and (2) an organ includes any person or
108. Natasha Arnpriester, Combating Impunity: The Private Military Indus-
try, Human Rights and the Legal Gap, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1189, 1229 (2017).
109. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 31 (Oct.
24, 2001) [hereinafter Wrongful Acts].
110. Id. art. 4.
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entity which has the status in accordance with the internal law
of the state.
111
Despite these rules, “there exists a range of situations where
non-state actors can possibly share responsibility for their con-
tributions to harmful outcomes.”
112
According to Article 5, which is titled “Conduct of persons or
entities exercising elements of governmental authority,”
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the
state under Article 4, but which is empowered by the law of
that state to exercise elements of the governmental authority,
is considered an act of the state under international law, pro-
vided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the par-
ticular instance.
113
This article addresses the “increasingly common phenomenon of
parastatal entities, which exercise elements of governmental au-
thority in place of state organs, as well as situations where for-
mer state corporations have been privatized but retain certain
public or regulatory functions.”
114
Under Article 8, “the conduct of a person or group of persons
shall be considered an act of the state under international law if
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instruc-
tions of, or under the direction or control of, that state in carry-
ing out the conduct.”
115
In such instances the test is “whether
their conduct involve governmental activity.”
116
This commonly
occurs when “state organs supplement their action” by employ-
ment of private entities who act “as auxiliaries while remaining
outside the official structure of the state.”
117
Furthermore, ac-
cording to Article 7 of the Draft Articles, under the circum-
stances where the individual or entity authorized to conduct gov-
ernmental activity “exceeds its authority or contravenes its
given instruction,” the action is considered to be an act of the
state under international law.
118
111. Id.
112. d’Aspremont et al., supra note 16, at 49²67.
113. Wrongful Acts, supra note 109, art. 5.
114. Id. cmt. 1.
115. Id. art. 8.
116. Id. cmt. 1²2.
117. Id.
118. Id. art. 7. The Draft Articles does, however, distinguish “cases where
officials acted in their capacity, as such albeit unlawfully or contrary to instruc-
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B. When Are the Actions of an MNE Attributable to the State?
What about the Actions of SOEs?
Examples of when the actions of non-state entities, including
MNEs, may be attributed to a state can be found under Article
5 and 8 of the Draft Articles. For example, according to Com-
mentary 2 of Article 5, non-state entities include “public corpo-
rations, semi-public entities, and even in special cases, private
companies, provided that the entity is empowered by the law of
the [s]tate to exercise functions of a public character normally
exercised by state organs.”
119
This includes “private security
firms [contracted] to act as prison guards and in that capacity
may exercise public powers, such as powers of detention and dis-
cipline pursuant to a judicial sentence or to prison regula-
tions.”
120
According to Article 8, Commentary 2, examples of en-
tities operating “under the control or instructions of the state”
include those who are “employed as [auxiliary military or volun-
teers] to neighboring countries to carry out particular missions
abroad]” despite not being “part of the state’s armed forces.”
121
The conduct of state-owned and controlled enterprises raises
its own set of questions and issues.
122
International law recog-
nizes that corporate entities, even state-owned entities, are le-
gally separate from their shareholders under national law, and
it will recognize this separateness except in circumstances
where “the corporate veil is a mere device for fraud or evasion”
of liability.
123
Therefore, just because a corporation is state-
owned does not mean the actions of the entity is automatically
attributable to the state.
124
Instead, the “conduct [of the state
tions, from cases where the conduct is so removed from the scope of their offi-
cial functions that it should be assimilated to that of private individuals, not
attributable to the State.” In such circumstances, such conduct should be con-
sidered activity “carried out by persons cloaked with governmental authority.”
Id. cmt. 7.
119. Id. art. 5, cmt. 8.
120. Id.
121. Id. art. 8, cmt. 2. Identifying whether the conduct “was carried out under
the direction or control of the state” is more complex. There will be attribution
to the state “only if [the state] directed or controlled the specific operation and
the conduct complained of was an integral part of that operation.” Additionally,
“the degree of control exercised by the State” over the entity in question is a
key issue in the determination of attribution. Id. cmt. 3²4.
122. Id. cmt. 6.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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owned enterprise] is considered to be separate unless it was ex-
ercising elements of governmental authority within themeaning
of Article 5.”
125
If, however, “there is evidence that the state was
using its ownership interest or control of a corporation to achieve
a particular result, . . . the conduct in question has been at-
tributed to the state.”
126
IV. A CLOSE EVALUATION OF THE ICOC AND THE ICOCA³AN
INNOVATIVE APPROACH IN PREVENTINGHUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS BY PRIVATEMILITARY SECURITY CORPORATIONS
(PMSCS)
This Part will evaluate the ICoC and ICoCA in detail to better
understand how the innovative multi-stakeholder oversight
committee, consisting of representatives from corporate entities,
civil society groups and state actors, strives to prevent private
military security providers from committing human rights vio-
lations by better regulation of corporate practices.
Section A briefly discusses the formation of the ICoC for con-
textual purposes, while Section B discusses the formation of the
ICoCA and closely examines the structure, governance and func-
tion of the oversight committee³an innovative mechanism with
significant potential in the regulation of PMSCs.
A. Formation of the ICoC
Similar to the emerging trend in cyber surveillance, state use
of PMSCs has greatly expanded, sparked in large by the United
States’ reliance on contractors in the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
127
Moreover, globalization and the trend toward outsourc-
ing government functions to the private sector has increasingly
expanded opportunities for the growth of transactional business
125. Id. cmt. 6.
126. Id. “In one case before the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal” the tri-
bunal found a state established foundation, which “held property for charitable
purposes under close governmental control,” was a public and not a private
entity, and the foundation’s “administration of allegedly appropriated property
fell under Article 5.” Id. art. 5, cmt. 2.
127. Reema Shah,Beating Blackwater: Using Domestic Legislation to Enforce
the International Code of Conduct for Private Military Companies, 123 YALE
L.J. 2259, 2259 (2014).
818 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
sectors like private security.
128
The increased rise in PMSCs has
also been met with growing controversy over reports of unpun-
ished criminal misconduct and human rights abuses.
129
For ex-
ample, in the 1990s, DynCorp employees hired to represent the
United States contingent in the United Nations Police Task
Force in Bosnia were involved in sex trafficking scandals.
130
In
September 2007, the United States State Department con-
tracted with the private military firm, Blackwater USA, which
provided the contractors that opened fire upon the busy Nisour
Square in Baghdad, killing numerous unarmed Iraqi citizens,
including young children.
131
In 2004, security contractors em-
ployed to be interrogators by CACI International and Titan were
involved in the AbuGharib prison abuses.
132
There are a number
of challenging problems, however, with seeking to remedy
PMSCs’ human rights abuses.
133
The combination of “the limited
128. Amol Mehra, Bridging Accountability Gaps – The Proliferation of Pri-
vate Military and Security Companies and Ensuring Accountability for Human
Rights Violations, 22 GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J., 323, 323 (2010).
The use of PMSC in Iraq is illustrative of the complexity
stemming from the proliferation of this group of actors. At
least 310 private security companies from around the world
have received contracts from U.S. agencies to protect Ameri-
can and Iraqi officials, installations, convoys, and other enti-
ties in Iraq since 2003. And with more than six years into the
conflict in Iraq, there has been no centralized database to ac-
count for all the securities companies in Iraq financed by
Americanmoney. Other democratic countries, such as United
Kingdom, for example, has contracted out to PMSCs for
training in operation, and maintenance of its nuclear subma-
rines while Australia and Canada have entirely privatized
many of their military services, including military recruiting
in Australia and electronic warfare in Canada.
Id. at 324.
129. Id. at 325.
130. Id.
131. Arnpriester, supra note 108, at 1192. See alsoMehra, supra note 128, at
325.
132. Id. at 325. Reports of the Abu Gharbib incident confirm the prison per-
sonnel, half of which was comprised of PMSCS, committed a series of human
rights violations, including torture, rape and murder, but none of the PMSCs
have been prosecuted despite the conviction of several U.S. military officers.
Arnpriester, supra note 108, at 1194²95.
133. Wallace, supra note 91, at 74.
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capacity of the state where PMSCs operat[e] . . . and the absence
of the extraterritorial reach of legislation from the states in
which the PMSCs are domiciled, generates a bubble of impu-
nity.”
134
Although the United Nations Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Imped-
ing the Exercise of Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination de-
veloped a draft International Convention on the Regulation,
Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Com-
panies, states with large private security industries, including
the United States and the United Kingdom, opposed the Con-
vention, and there will be significant opposition before it can be-
come law.
135
Instead, a joint initiative between Switzerland and
the International Committee of the Red Cross created the Mon-
treux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations
and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private
Military and Security Companies (“Montreux Document”),
which reiterated states’ international legal obligations as they
relate to human rights laws and provided “good practices” on the
use of PMSCs that were endorsed by several states.
136
Building
upon theMontreux Document, the ICoC was finalized in Novem-
ber 2010.
137
Unlike the Montreux Document, however, the ICoC
is directed toward PMSCs’ obligations and lays out guidelines
and international standards on human rights for PMSCs.
138
The ICoC “is the fruit of a multi-stakeholder initiative with the
overarching objectives to articulate human rights responsibili-
ties of PMSCs,” by establishing a set of principles and standards
consistent with international law that PMSCs, especially those
134. Id. at 76.
135. Id. at 85. The Draft Convention included provisions that restricted the
type of activities that can be carried out by PMSCs, and a number of positive
obligations (legislative and administrative) upon the states “to ensure PMSCs
and their personnel are held accountable for violations of applicable national
or international law,” including ensuring PMSCs to fulfill proper due diligence
requirements. Nigel White, Due Diligence Obligations Developing a Responsi-
bility Regime for PMSCs, 31 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, 233, 252 (2012).
136. Arnpriester, supra note 108, at 1223.
137. Id. at 1224.
138. Id. at 1225. ICoC is the first international regulatory code aimed directly
at improving human rights performance of private security providers. Nicola
Jagers, Regulating the Private Security Industry: Connecting the Public and
the Private through Transnational Private Regulation, 6 HUM. RTS & INT’L
LEGALDISCOURSE 56, 67 (2012).
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situated in conflict-ridden zones, should comply with.
139
Over the
course of an eighteen-month process, private security compa-
nies, states, including Australia, United Kingdom and the
United States, civil society organizations and academics collab-
orated to produce “a code of conduct for the private security in-
dustry based on international human rights and humanitarian
law standards.”
140
In 2010, fifty-eight PMSCs signed on; how-
ever, by 2013, 708 companies formally committed to operate ac-
cording to the ICoC’s directives.
141
The ICoC “explicitly applies key principles of human rights to
PMSCs, [by filling] in important gaps in international law with-
out the need for a long and laborious treaty-revision process.”
142
The ICoC provides detailed obligations requiring “signatory
PMSCs to reform particular organizational and procedural prac-
tices.”
143
For example, PMSCs “agree to prohibit personnel from
engaging in sexual exploitation” and “detention unless a govern-
ment contract specifically allows it, [and even if it is allowed],
detainees must be treated in accordance to international law.”
144
Moreover, PMSCs “must commit to vet[ting] and train[ing] em-
ployees extensively,” including checking and ensuring “that all
personnel do not lack the character and fitness to perform secu-
rity services pursuant to the ICoC.”
145
The ICoC even “extends
these requirements to subcontractors” of the PMSC; thus, signa-
tory PMSCs “must take reasonable and appropriate steps to en-
sure” the subcontractor’s personnel also comply with the princi-
ples of the ICoC.
146
The ICoC “is particularly stringent in requir-
ing PMSCs to prepare incident report[s] documenting any inci-
dent[s] involving its personnel that involves the use of any
weapon” or any “case of torture or . . . cruel treatment,” which
“must be submitted to the client who contracted the PMSC, and
139. History, INT’L CODE CONDUCT ASS’N, https://icoca.ch/en/history (last vis-
ited Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter ICoCA Website]. “The main purpose of the
ICoC is to set forth a commonly agreed set of principles for PMSCs and to es-
tablish a foundation to translate those principles into related standards as well
as governance and oversight mechanisms.” Jagers, supra note 138, at 67.
140. ICoCA Website, supra note 139.
141. Id.
142. Laura Dickinson, Regulating the Privatized Security Industry: The
Promise of Public/Private Governance, 63 EMORY L.J. 417, 420²21 (2013).
143. Id. at 421.
144. Id. at 422.
145. Id. at 423.
146. Id.
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other competent authorities.”
147
Finally, the ICoC obligates each
PMSC “to establish internal grievance procedures for both its
employees and third parties to invoke in cases of alleged . . . vi-
olations,” and such “[p]rocedures must be fair, accessible and of-
fer effective remedies.”
148
B. The Formation of the ICoCA, an Innovative Approach in Reg-
ulation with Significant Potential, and a Close Examination of
Its Structure and Governance Mechanism
The ICoCA is the oversight committee charged with monitor-
ing the implementation and compliance of the ICoC, consisting
of a Board of Directors, a General Assembly (GA), and a Secre-
tariat.
149
The GA appoints the Board of Directors, which consists
of “an even distribution of representatives from civil society
groups, states and the [PMSC] industry.”
150
The Board of Direc-
tors “serves as the executive body overseeing the Secretariat.” It
“report[s] on the implementation of the ICoC, make[s] recom-
mendations to the GA, and develops the ICoCA’s operating pro-
cedures.”
151
The Secretariat “gathers information for compliance
reports on the [PMSCs], receive[s] complaints from third par-
ties,” and “address[es] specific compliance concerns” with
PMSCs.
152
The ICoCA takes an integrated approach in its governance
mechanism. First, its “monitoring function is designed to iden-
tify concerns about or barriers to compliance with the ICoC” by
collecting information on the participating PMSCs through: “re-
mote monitoring (public source screening) . . . , company self-
assessment . . . and field based reviews (monitoring of specific
areas of companies performance).”
153
Second, its certification
function involves the review of a PMSC’s systems and policies to
determine if it meets “the principles and standards derived from
the ICoC,” as well as “the requirements for personnel manage-
ment and human rights performance.”
154
Finally, the ICoCA’s
“complaints function facilitates access to fair and accessible
147. Id. at 424.
148. Id.
149. Wallace, supra note 91, at 87.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. The ICoCA Overview, supra note 15.
154. Id. See also Wallace, supra note 91, at 87²88.
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grievance procedures” for individuals adversely affected by
PMSCs.
155
While the ICoC creates a series of procedures by
which PMSCs must follow, the ICoCA is “empowered to take
steps to support [signatory members] in their obligations under
the ICoC.”
156
In cases of noncompliance with the ICoC, the
ICoCA may impose sanctions, which include suspension or ter-
mination of membership or certification.
157
Although noncompli-
ance may not result in civil or criminal liability, the ICoC re-
gime, “has a far more robust compliance and accountability
mechanism than many other [existing] voluntary industry-
driven codes of conduct.” The “ultimate sanction of banishment
from the regime, [which] may render firms ineligible to receive
lucrative contracts,” may serve as an incentive for compliance,
“particularly if governments agree to only hire [ICoC] certified
contractors.”
158
After all, one of the “main reason[s] put forward
by PMSCs for joining the ICoC is their competitiveness and rep-
utational concerns . . . in preserving their government contracts,
since governments are among their main customers.”
159
For ex-
ample, states like the “United Kingdom and the United States
have announced they will require PMSCs to be signatories of the
ICoC.”
160
Although the ICoCA was formally launched in September
2013, it is still very much a newly established mechanism, such
that “it[s] complaint procedure only went into effect in Septem-
ber 2016, and it [only began] accepting complaints in early
2017.”
161
Thus, it is “not yet possible to assess the efficacy of this
procedure.”
162
While some scholars have already found weak-
nesses in the ICoCA’s proposed mechanism so far,
163
others have
155. The ICoCA Overview, supra note 15.
156. Dickinson, supra note 142, at 452.
157. Id. at 453.
158. Id.
159. Jagers, supra note 138, at 69.
160. Id.
161. Arnpriester, supra note 108, at 1228.
162. Id.
163. According to some scholars, the ICoC has introduced some extremely
positive developments but it suffers from some debilitating shortcomings that
reduce the effectiveness of the ICoCA’s remedial mechanism. Wallace, supra
note 91, at 97²98. For example, “the requirement that complainants exhaust
other avenues of redress [before approaching] ICoCA means [an unlikelihood
of] swift remedies . . . and the fact that the ICoC relies so heavily on external
2019] The Need for a Shared Responsibility Regime 823
argued for building upon the established ICoCA mechanism to
form a “self-regulation-plus” approach, where PMSCs not only
adhere to the ICoC and oversight body of the ICoCA, but also
abide by the certification and auditing standards adopted by
states, which may potentially ensure PMSCs respect and comply
with human rights standards.
164
Therefore, “while adherence to
the ICoC and membership of the ICoCA appear voluntary in na-
ture, . . . their approach does resemble a form of mixed co-regu-
lation where states, civil society actors, and private actors³in
this case, PMSCs³are regulating jointly.”
165
There are arguably
“elements of meta-regulation where PMSCs must seek ¶official
validation’ . . . [for] governmental contractual arrangements via
[approval by the state and by] membership of the ICoCA.”
166
Thus, this “self-regulation-plus system may even have the po-
tential to be a positive and sophisticated example of [a hybrid-
ized system consisting of both market and social regulation].”
167
A key factor for the effective enforcement of the ICoC by the
ICoCA, a form of TPR, is the extent to which the state actively
participates with private regulators.
168
Active state participa-
tion should include “incorporating the [ICoC] standards into
their public procurement policies or by requiring [its contracting
PMSCs] to do so.”
169
States must “ actively support the develop-
ment of the emerging certification process to ensure that the sys-
tem matures effectively and becomes more widely recognized
factors, from groups offering certification services to external remedial mecha-
nisms, leaves its effectiveness at the [mercy of third parties.]” Id. Furthermore,
there is skepticism surrounding the ICoCA’s enforcement ability because of its
reliance on market forces and its limited capacity in addressing complaints
through sanctions. Id. Overall, some scholars have found the ICoCA to have “a
disproportionate focus on procedural compliance of PMSCs . . . rather than
substantive compliance with international human rights law.” Id. Despite its
“great deal of promise,” the ICoC may be “far from providing an effective rem-
edy for human rights violations at the hands of PMSCs.” Id. See also Arn-
priester, supra note 108, at 1227. See also Jagers, supra note 138, at 83²84.
164. Sorcha MacLeod, Private Security Companies and Shared Responsibil-
ity: The Turn to Multi-Stakeholder Standard-Setting and Monitoring Through
Self-Regulation – ‘Plus’, 62 NETH. INT. L. REV., 119, 122²24 (2015).
165. Id. at 123.
166. Id. at 124.
167. Id.
168. Jagers, supra note 138, at 86.
169. Id. at 86²87.
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and adopted.”
170
In doing so, states would demonstrate to the in-
ternational community that their “due diligence obligations un-
der international human rights law are being met,” because “do-
ing anything [less] will be perceived as unsatisfactorily shifting
all responsibility for human rights violations onto PMSCs.”
171
Thus, the ICoC and ICoCA regulatory mechanism carries poten-
tial and “with support of important gatekeepers, such as the
United Kingdom and the United States . . . there is potential for
¶hardening’ of the Norms in the ICoC.”
172
V. PROPOSITION OF A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY REGIME THAT
BUILDSUPON THEMULTI-STAKEHOLDER REGULATORY
APPROACHUSED BY THE ICOC AND ICOCA
Finally, this Part will evaluate the proposition of making
states accountable stakeholders by forming a shared responsi-
bility regime
173
between states and MNEs. Section A will sum-
marize why such a shared responsibility regime with strong
state participations is needed. Next, Section B will describe how
a shared responsibility regime can be formed by building upon
the newly established multi-stakeholder approach taken by the
ICoC and ICoCA. This Note will also explore how a shared re-
sponsibility regime can be transferred to the regulation of the
sales of cyber-surveillance spyware by MNEs by building upon
the Wassenaar Agreement³the current international arrange-
ment dealing with arm transfers, including the transfers of spy-
ware. The proposed shared responsibility regime will not only
oblige state actors to monitor corporate actions to prevent hu-
man rights violations, but it will also provide a better possibility
of recourse to victims of human rights violations.
A. Why Such a Shared Responsibility Regime with a Strong
State Participation is Imperative and Necessary
As the world has become more interconnected, there has been
an “increase [in] the likelihood of concerted action,” but the cur-
rent international legal framework does not “address this new
170. MacLeod, supra note 164, at 138²39.
171. Id.
172. Jagers, supra note 138, at 87.
173. d’Aspremont et al., supra note 16, at 49²67.
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reality.”
174
The inapplicability of international laws in light of
these “modern international relations” calls for a serious discus-
sion about shared responsibility.
175
It has been proposed that
“the international legal system allows for various conceptualiza-
tions of the ¶shared responsibility’ between states and MNEs,
which operate in parallel towards closing of the perceived ¶ac-
countability gap’ associated with the conduct of the MNEs.”
176
As previously discussed, the Draft Articles do not turn a blind
eye to the operation of MNEs. Instead, some of the rules are ac-
tually amenable to corporate conduct that can be attributed to
the state should there exist a requisite link between the corpo-
ration and the state, potentially generating state responsibil-
ity.
177
If a corporation “[acts] on the instruction of, or under the
direction or control of the state,” its conduct may be attributable
to the state.
178
Moreover, “situations of shared responsibility in-
volving non-state actors may exceptionally arise, [under] insti-
tutional regimes, where states contract with a non-state actor,
such as a corporation, to carry out certain activities.”
179
Similar
to “the undeniability that state regulation is imperative in the
174. Andrew Nollkaempur, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 42 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359, 436 (2013).
175. Id.
176. Karavias, supra note 18, at 91.
177. Id. at 96²97.
178. Id.
179. d’Aspremont et al., supra note 16, at 56. For example:
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC), corporations can enter into a contract to explore
polymetallic nodules and accordingly incur obligations and
responsibility under international law, and in its 2011 Advi-
sory Opinion, the Seabed Chamber of the International Tri-
bunal of the Law of the Sea held that joint and several liabil-
ity arises where different entities have contributed to the
same damages so that full reparation can be claimed from all
or any of them. While the Chamber may only have referred
to responsibility shared between states and international or-
ganizations, it is arguable that also corporations, on the basis
of the contract, may share responsibility for wrongful acts in
breach of the contract, but such a scenario follows the exist-
ence of responsibility due to contractual obligations as op-
posed to international law.
Id.
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regulation of PMSCs, given the nature of its activities in conflict-
ridden zones and intimate connection to states,”
180
regulation of
spyware also requires strong state participation.
B. Transferring the Multi-Stakeholder Approach of the ICoC
and ICoCA to Build Upon the Current Export Regulation Re-
gime Found in the Wassenaar Arrangement
“To date, the most notable international agreement dealing
with arm transfers, including the transfers of surveillance spy-
ware, is the Wassenaar Arrangement,” where forty-one partici-
pating states voluntarily agreed “to meet on a regular basis to
ensure that transfers of arms and technologies are carried out
responsibly and in furtherance of international and regional
peace and security.”
181
Formed in 1996, the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment “attempts to control the proliferation of dual-use technolo-
gies through a variety of mechanisms, including controls on dis-
tribution, information-sharing among member states and the
notification of transfers or denials of dual-use goods to non-mem-
ber states.”
182
After the discovery of information technologies,
180. Jagers, supra note 138, at 88.
181. Annyssa Bellal, Arms Transfers and International Human Rights Law,
in WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 448, 467²68 (Stuart
Casey-Maslen ed., 2014).
182. Jamil Jaffer, Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 519, 520 (2002). The Wassenaar Arrangement formed in 1996
had four primary goals:
(1) members sought to promote transparency and greater re-
sponsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms
and dual-use goods and technologies; (2) members aspired to
use domestic policies to ensure that transfers of conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technologies would not contrib-
ute to the development of military capabilities; (3) members
wanted to complement and reinforce the existing control re-
gimes for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery sys-
tems, as well as other internationally recognized measures
designed to promote transparency and great responsibility;
and (4) members were interested in enhancing cooperation to
prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use
items for military end-uses if the situation in a region or the
behavior of a state is, or becomes, a cause of serious concern.
Innokenty Pyetranker, An Umbrella in a Hurricane: Cyber Technology and the
December 2013 Amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement, 13 NW. J. TECH. &
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from French-based Amesys in the surveillance systems of former
Prime Minister Muammar Gadhafi’s regime in Libya, the par-
ticipating states all unanimously agreed to adopt amendments
to the Wassenaar List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies in
December 2013.
183
Additionally, the participating states reaf-
firmed their commitment to “maintain effective export controls
[of arms and technologies] on the agreed list” and ensure their
national policies “do not undermine international and regional
security.”
184
Furthermore, the participating states agreed to con-
tinue periodically reviewing the agreed list to “take into account
technological developments” and continue their exchange of in-
formation, including a report of any export denials.
185
Each participating state remains the sole arbiter of the ap-
proval or denial of export licenses, “thereby mitigating [the] po-
tential efficacy” of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
186
While some
states have legislated, at both regional and national levels, laws
in compliance to the Wassenaar Arrangement, many states still
INTELL. PROP. 153, 161 (2015). Thus, the members “committed to sharing in-
formation, controlling the distribution of items on the munitions and dual-use
lists, and notifying one another of transfers and denials of listed items to non-
members.” Id.
183. Roszel Thomsen & Philip Thomsen, Export Controls on Intrusion and
Surveillance Items: Noble Sentiments Meet the Law of Unintended Conse-
quences, 19 J. INTERNET L. 22, 22²23 (Sept. 2015).
The 2013 amendments manifested in a number of changes to
the Wassenaar Arrangement’s control list of dual-use goods
and technologies; two changes was the addition of a category
which mandates export controls on certain forms of software
and associated goods, specifically IP network communica-
tions surveillance systems and an addition of a category
which mandates export controls of “intrusion software”³
software specially designed or modified to avoid detection by
monitoring tools, performing any of the following: (a) extrac-
tion of data or information, from a computer or network-ca-
pable device or (b) modification of the standard execution
path of a program or process in order to allow the execution
of externally provided instructions.
Pyetranker, supra note 182, at 163.
184. What is the Wassaneer Arrangement?, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT,
http://www.wassenaar.org/the-wassenaar-arrangement/ (last visited Nov. 12,
2017).
185. Id.
186. Bellal, supra note 181, at 468.
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continue to “have no legislation at all to prohibit or even limit
transfers where weapons are likely to be used to violate human
rights.”
187
Because “the issuance of export licenses is at the na-
tional discretion of each participating state and based on states’
unique perspectives and interests, . . . implementation of the
multilateral effort to effectively control the acquisition of [dual-
use goods] by governments with questionable human rights rec-
ords” has been inconsistent.
188
While the efficacy of the Wasse-
naar Arrangement is currently subpar, it does illustrate a possi-
ble entry point for other stakeholders, such as state actors and
civil society groups, to partake in an otherwise private transac-
tion. Similar to the need to build upon the ICoCA’s approach,
more active state participation will be very important. Other-
wise, the MNE selling the spyware would only be attributable to
a state actor if the MNE happens to be a SOE or is under the
control or direction of the state.
This Note proposes the development of a code analogous to the
ICoC by building upon the export regulating mechanisms pro-
posed in the Wassenaar Arrangement, including controls on dis-
tribution, information-sharing, notification of transfers or deni-
als of dual-use goods and other relevant procedures, to better
prevent human rights violations. Additionally, an oversight
committee similar to the multi-stakeholder structure of ICoCA,
consisting of equal representatives from civil society groups (i.e.
Amnesty International), MNEs that produce and sell spyware
and state actors that approve the exportation of goods (i.e. the
United States Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and
Security), should be created to form a shared responsibility re-
gime between state actors and non-state actors. Like the ICoCA,
the oversight committee would review the MNEs corporate sys-
tems, policies and personnel management to determine if they
meet the principles and standards derived by the newly devel-
oped code for membership and exportation of dual-use goods.
Moreover, the oversight committee would monitor for non-com-
pliance and address complaints of human rights violations to
support MNE members in performing their obligations under
the code. If MNEs are found in non-compliance, the oversight
committee would have the power to issue sanctions or revoke
membership.
187. Id. at 471.
188. Thomsen & Thomsen, supra note 183, at 23.
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While the addition of civil society groups in this multi-stake-
holder approach may encourage more transparency compared to
the previous arrangement, where each state had its discretion
in approving or denying the exportation of an MNE’s dual-use
product, the most important part of the shared responsibility re-
gime remains the need for active participation of states and na-
tional legislation to correspond to the proposed code. First, the
state’s national legislation should reflect the export controls
agreed upon by the ICoC. Similar to the PMSCs’ membership in
ICoCA, MNEs’ membership in the proposed regime and their
compliance to the code would affect their reputation in the cyber
surveillance industry, as well as their lucrative opportunities of
exporting their products in contractual sales. Moreover, a state’s
approval and issuance of export licenses for an MNE’s sales of
dual-use goods would depend on the MNE’s membership and
compliance to the proposed Code and regime. Under this pro-
posed regime, if the oversight committee fails to take action
against an MNE that does not comply to the proposed code, the
victim would be able to file a grievance with the proposed over-
sight committee and bring a civil claim against the state for a
human rights violation attributable to the state.
CONCLUSION
The use of cyber surveillance spyware has not only resulted in
the invasion of privacy of numerous citizens, but also a plethora
of other human rights violations ranging from arbitrary deten-
tion, torture and even death.
189
The five cases filed against the
French corporation, Amesys, in Paris High Court’s Crimes
against Humanity and War Crimes Unit, are just a few of the
many examples of such human rights violations.
190
Unfortu-
nately, international law and, more specifically, international
human rights law only imposes legal obligations to states and
state actors.
191
Soft law, such as the United Nations Guiding
Principles of Business and Human Rights, may have admirably
brought attention to the commitment businesses should have to-
wards protecting human rights, but the Guidelines remain
solely voluntary without power to legally obligate businesses to
189. Gupta, supra note 12, at 1359²60.
190. FIDH, supra note 8.
191. KARAVIAS, supra note 19, at 19.
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comply.
192
Thus, the state-centric focus of international human
rights law has created a number of problems for lawyers trying
to hold corporations judicially accountable for human rights
abuses,
193
and the non-judicial grievance mechanisms relying on
soft law have resulted in the insufficiency of remedial measures
for human rights violations.
194
While the current international
legal framework does not turn a blind eye to the operation of
private corporations, legal obligations will arise only if private
corporate conduct can be attributed to the state.
195
Thus, a
shared responsibility regime, where the state becomes an ac-
countable stakeholder, must be developed.
196
It will not only ob-
ligate state actors to better monitor corporate actions to prevent
human rights violations, but will also provide a better possibility
of recourse to victims of human rights violations.
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